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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions on five counts of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2009).1 This Court has jurisdiction 
under the pour-over provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion to 
compel discovery? 
1
 The State cites to the current version of the relevant statutes except where 
changes in the statutes may be relevant to the claims on appeal. 
Standard of Review. This Court will reverse a decision to grant or deny 
discovery only where the trial court has abused its discretion. See State v. Spry, 2001 
UT App 75, f 8, 21 P.3d 675; State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026,1027 (Utah 1982),, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is reproduced in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For transactions occurring between October 3 and October 24,2006, the State 
charged Defendant with five counts of distribution of a controlled substance, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2009). 
All counts were alleged to have been committed in a drug free zone. See id.2 
Defendant moved to compel the State to produce (1) a copy of the return of a 
search warrant issued on October 18,2006, and executed at Defendant's residence 
2
 In the same information, for a February 3, 2007 incident, the State charged 
two counts of possession of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2009), and one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West Supp. 2009). R27-25. Defendant moved to sever the February 
possession counts from the October distribution counts. See R66-58. The State 
agreed to the severance. See R66-58; R291:5; R292:3,5. After his trial and sentencing 
on the distribution charges, Defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge on one of the 
possession counts, and the State dismissed the other two counts. R284-79, 277-75. 
Defendant did not reserve any right to appeal his conviction on the possession 
count, and it is not properly the subject of this appeal. See id. 
2 
on October 25,2006; (2) a copy of "any and air probable cause affidavits in support 
of any search warrant issued between January 2006 and January 2007 on 
Defendant's residence and the return of the corresponding search warrant; (3) a 
"text copy" of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force procedure for controlled 
buys, and (4) a "text copy" of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force procedure 
for using voluntary or paid confidential informants. R159-57; see also R294-93; 
R297:15-19. The trial court denied the motion. R297:15-19. 
Trial was held on the distribution charges, and a jury found Defendant guilty 
on all five counts. See R200-198, 207-203; R288:234-38. The trial court sentenced 
Defendant to five concurrent prison terms of five years to life. R263-62; see also 
R277-75. Defendant timely appealed. R303.3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The crime 
Defendant sold methamphetamine to a confidential informant on five 
different dates between October 3 and October 24, 2006. See R288:68-88,128-41. 
3
 The State was not able to locate the notice of appeal in the record transmitted 
to this Court. The docket, however, indicates that the notice of appeal was filed on 
January 11, 2008, and first supplemental index shows that it should be included in 
the record at R303. 
3 
Additional facts 
Mark Troxell is a Provo City police officer. R288:59-59. In October 2006 he 
was assigned to the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force, supervising a team of 
detectives conducting drug investigations. R288:59. 
Troxell met Arthur Allred when Allred was referred to the task force by the 
Utah County Attorney's Office in approximately July or August 2006. R288:64. 
Troxell had not dealt with Allred before that time. Id. Allred told the Troxell that he 
had information about Defendant's having sold methamphetamine. R288:65. He 
said that he had been to Defendant's house and had purchased drugs from 
Defendant. Id. He told Troxell that he could buy more drugs from Defendant. Id. 
He gave Troxell an approximate address. Id. Troxell was familiar with the address. 
Id. 
Troxell then arranged to have Allred purchase drugs from Tanner. R288:66. 
Troxell arranged for buys on October 3, 5,12,19, and 24, 2006. R288:66-89. After 
Allred called Defendant to arrange for each drug purchase, Troxell and other task 
force officers met Allred to give him "buy money" and to search him and his vehicle 
to ensure that he had no drugs. Id. They also observed Allred drive to and enter 
Defendant's residence. Id. After each buy, they met Allred at a nearby location 
where he gave them the drugs. Id. The officers did not observe the actual 
transactions, which occurred inside the residence. Id. 
4 
On October 18, 2006, Judge Samuel McVey signed a warrant authorizing a 
search of Defendant's residence. R297:16. The warrant was executed on October 25, 
one day following the last of Alfred's controlled buys. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant has not adequately challenged the trial court's denial of his motion 
to compel. In denying his first and second requests —for discovery of copies of 
certain search warrants, their supporting affidavits, and the corresponding warrant 
returns — the trial court concluded that they could not likely be found and that they 
were not sufficiently relevant to require production. Defendant has not addressed 
the trial court's determination that the documents were not likely available. Thus, 
this Court need not address his challenge to the trial court's relevancy ruling, as an 
alternative basis for the denying discovery—the unavailability of the documents — 
survives to support the trial court's decision. 
Moreover, to the extent Defendant challenges the denial of his third and 
fourth requests —for discovery of "text copies" of the Major Crimes Task Force's 
written procedures on working with confidential informants and conducting 
controlled buys, he has not challenged the trial court's determination that those 
documents did not exist. Thus, this Court need not address the Defendant's 
challenge to the trial court's alternative grounds for denying discovery, i.e., that the 
written procedures were not relevant to the matters before the court. 
5 
In any case, the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied 
Defendant's motion asking the Court to compel the prosecutor to produce various 
documents. Defendant has not shown, as he must, that the prosecutor had 
knowledge of the documents and that the documents would be exculpatory or were 
needed to prepare a defense. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT DENIED THE MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
In his motion to compel discovery, Defendant sought four categories of 
information: 
1. A copy of the " Return of Search Warrant Affidavit for the Search 
Warrant issued on October[] 18,2006 [and executed October 25,2006] 
on the residence of 375 [W]est 300 North in Provo, Utah," 
2. A copy of any and all other Probable Cause Affidavits in Support 
and Application for a Search Warrant and the Return of Search 
Warrant Affidavits for the residence 375 [West] 300 North in Provo, 
Utah between the dates of January 2006 and January 2007 .... 
3. A text copy of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force procedure 
for controlled buys. 
4. A text copy of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force procedure 
for using voluntary or paid confidential informants. 
6 
R159-58; see also R297:12-19.4 The trial court denied the motion. R297:15-19. 
On appeal, Defendant claims that "the trial court erred in denying [his] 
motion to compel discovery/' Br. Appellant at 12. He argues that the material 
sought "was exculpatory" and "satisfied the good cause standard under [rule 16, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure]." Id. at 14. 
This Court should not review Defendant's claim, because he has not 
adequately challenged the trial court's grounds for its ruling. In any event, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion to compel, as 
the prosecutor was not required to disclose any of the materials Defendant sought. 
A. The trial court properly denied Defendant's motion asking 
that the prosecutor be compelled to produce the return of the 
search warrant executed October 25,2006. 
Defendant first asked the trial court to compel the prosecutor to produce the 
return of the search warrant executed October 25, 2006. R159. The trial court 
properly exercised its discretion to deny that request. R297:16-17. 
Background. At argument on Defendant's motion to compel, the parties 
addressed the requested October 25 search warrant return. Defendant argued that 
4
 In his Statement of the Case, Defendant references several earlier discovery 
requests. See Br. Appellant at 2-4. Only the requests made in his September 25,2007 
motion to compel are relevant to this appeal. 
7 
the search warrant return was relevant to the credibility of Arthur Allred, the 
confidential informant (CI). See R297:2-7. Defendant claimed that because no 
charges were filed based on the October 25,2006 execution of the warrant, the police 
may not have found drugs, the CI may therefore have lied about the presence of 
drugs in the residence, and the CI may therefore have lied about other things, in 
particular, about the drug transactions that were the bases for the charges in this 
case. See id. 
The prosecutor countered that, even assuming that no drugs were found 
when the warrant was executed on October 25, that did not mean the CI had lied 
when he swore that Defendant had sold him drugs at the residence on several 
occasions in the three-week period before the search. See R297:13. The prosecutor 
explained that Defendant could have sold the drugs, used the drugs, or hidden the 
drugs. See id. The prosecutor also explained that he had tried, but failed, to locate 
the warrant return. R297:16. 
The court responded, "That's what I thought. So I'm not sure this Court has 
one. If you haven't found it here, I don't know that we can find it either/' R297:17. 
The court explained that the Fourth District did not, at the time the warrant was 
issued and executed, have "an organized way" of retaining and filing warrants, the 
8 
affidavits upon which they were based, and the warrant returns. Id.5 The court 
explained that there was a "real question" about "whether anybody can find a copy 
of the return on the warrant." R297.16. 
In addition, the court ruled that the return on warrant was not relevant to the 
counts for which Defendant was tried. R297:17. The warrant was not executed until 
the day after the final offense for which Defendant was being tried. See id. Thus, it 
was not relevant to show what evidence had been developed with respect to the 
charged crimes. See R297:13,17. 
The court did not immediately address Defendant's claim that (a) if no 
charges were filed, then perhaps no drugs were found, and (b) if no drugs were 
found, perhaps Defendant lied when he swore that he had seen them on the 
premises, and (c) if he lied in his affidavit, perhaps he lied when he told police that 
5
 The October 18 warrant was issued and executed just over a month before 
the Utah Supreme Court rendered its decision in Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79,149 
P.3d 352, which required "that magistrates issuing search warrants retain in their 
custody copies of all search warrants issued, as well as the material supporting 
search warrant applications, rather than surrendering to law enforcement the only 
copies of such material." Id. at f 22. The Supreme Court also noted that "[although 
the statute contemplates that law enforcement will return the warrant and related 
materials to the magistrate, who will then deliver them to the court, magistrates in 
the Fourth District 'typically instruct[ed] law enforcement to deliver the documents 
to the court clerk for keeping/" Id. at f 17 n.3. 
9 
he received drugs from Defendant in the five controlled buys that were charged. See 
R297:2-7. But, as explained below, the court later in its ruling set forth its reasoning 
that an attempt to impeach on that basis would require calling a deputy county 
attorney to explain why charges were not filed and that the probative value of any 
evidence that might be elicited was outweighed by the danger of wasted time. See 
R29718. 
Surviving alternative basis for trial court's decision. When challenging a 
court's decision on appeal, a defendant "must address all of the circumstances upon 
which the court's decision was based." State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, ^ 20, 95 
P.3d 1216, affd, 2005 UT 48,122 P.3d 571. When the defendant challenges only some 
of those bases, this Court "need not address whether the trial court erred in 
considering th[ose] bas[e]s" because the other bases survive to support the trial 
court's decision. State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 810 (Utah App. 1998); accord State v. 
Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993); State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 
1990). 
Here, Defendant has not adequately challenged the trial court's bases for its 
ruling. His argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to 
compel because the evidence sought was "potentially exculpatory or [constituted] 
mitigation." Br. Appellant at 17. Thus, he challenges the trial court's determination 
that the evidence was not sufficiently relevant. But the trial court denied the motion 
10 
for two reasons: first, it was not likely that the prosecutor or anyone else could find 
the October 25 warrant return, and, second, Defendant had not shown that the 
warrant return contained information that was exculpatory or so potentially 
exculpatory that the prosecutor should be compelled to produce it. Defendant has 
not mentioned, let alone addressed, the first basis for the trial court's denial of his 
motion to compel Thus, an unchallenged alternative ground survives to support 
the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to compel production of the October 
25 warrant return. Because Defendant has not challenged the trial court's 
determination that the warrant return could not likely be found, this Court need not 
address his claim that the evidence was exculpatory and necessary for the 
preparation of his defense. See State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, | 20; Baker, 963 
P.2dat810. 
Merits. In any case, the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to 
compel the prosecutor to produce the return of the warrant executed October 25. 
Under rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a "prosecutor shall disclose 
to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge:... (4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense 
for reduced punishment; and (5) any other item of evidence which the court 
11 
determines on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in 
order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense/' Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a). 
This rule requires the prosecutor to disclose upon request only those materials 
of which he has knowledge. State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, If 9, 974 P.2d 279. Because 
"[t]he knowledge of the prosecutor's staff and the investigating police officers is 
imputed to the prosecutor, he must also disclose the materials of which they have 
knowledge. Id. at f 12. But the rule "does not require [the prosecutor] to make an 
investigation on behalf of the defendant, searching for exculpatory and mitigating 
evidence/7 Id. at f^ 9 (citation omitted). And the prosecutor violates the rule "only 
when he fails to disclose materials which he knows or should know contain 
evidence that is exculpatory or that would otherwise be helpful to the defendant in 
the preparation of his defense." Id. at f 12. 
Here, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny Defendant's 
motion to compel the prosecutor to produce the October 25 search return. The 
prosecutor is required to produce only those materials of which he has knowledge. 
See id. at f 9. The prosecutor had looked for, but could not find the document. 
R297:16-17. Thus, he did not have the knowledge necessary to produce it. 
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that anyone could have found the return. 
See R297:16-17. As explained, because of deficiencies in the court's filing system at 
12 
the time the warrant was executed, there was a "real question about "whether 
anybody c[ould] find a copy of the return. R297:16-17. 
In addition, Defendant had not shown that the search warrant return was 
evidence that would tend to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment. See Pliego, 
1999 UT 8, Tf 12. Defendant's theory that the warrant return might be exculpatory 
consisted of one speculation upon another. Defendant speculated that, because 
Defendant was not charged with a crime based on anything found when the 
warrant was executed on October 25, the return may have shown that no drugs 
were found. See R297:2-5. And if no drugs were found, that might have meant that 
the CI lied or was unreliable when he said in his October 18,2006 affidavit that they 
were present. See id. And if he lied or was unreliable then, he might have lied or 
been unreliable when he testified to Defendant's drugs sales in the three weeks that 
preceded the October 25 search. See id. 
But nothing in the record shows that Arthur Allred, the CI who conducted the 
controlled buys, provided any information to support the warrant executed on 
October 25,2006. And even if he did, the mere fact that charges were not filed does 
not show that he lacked credibility. As the court explained, even though charges 
were not filed, drugs may still have been found. "There are myriad[].. . reasons for 
which charges [might not] be filed." R297:18. Among them, a prosecutor may not 
13 
want to "burn [his] CI." Id. And, as explained above, even had the return shown 
that drugs were not found, that would not have shown that Defendant lied when he 
swore that he had seen drugs on the premises. Rather, it could have meant that 
Defendant had used, sold, or hidden them. R297:17. Thus, any claim that the 
documents would have been exculpatory would have been speculative. When 
Defendant moved the court to compel the prosecution to produce the documents 
associated with warrant issued October 18 and executed October 25, he was simply 
asking for the opportunity to conduct a fishing expedition. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by denying the motion. See State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026,1027-28 
(Utah 1982) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a 
defense motion to produce evidence when that evidence "was no longer in the 
possession of the State and when there was no showing of its evidentiary 
significance to the defense"). 
Harmlessness. Finally, Defendant has not shown that he suffered any harm 
as a result of the trial court's ruling. The October 25 warrant return was not 
evidence that was needed by the defense to prepare its case. See Utah R. Evid. 
16(a)(5). The Major Crimes Task Force began working with the CI when the CI 
contacted the Force in July or August of 2006. R288:65. The CI provided 
Defendant's name to Officer Scott Troxell. Id. Officer Troxellthen worked with the 
CI and participated in setting up the controlled buys from Defendant. R288: 65-99. 
14 
Officer Troxell testified at trial about his work with the CI. Id. On cross-
examination, defense counsel could simply have asked Officer Troxell if the CI 
provided information that was used to obtain the warrant for the October 25 search 
and, if so, whether drugs were found when the warrant was executed.6 Defense 
counsel did not. 
B. The trial court properly denied Defendant's motion asking 
that the prosecutor be compelled to produce all probable cause 
affidavits and warrant returns on searches between January 
2006 and January 2007. 
Defendant next asked the trial court to compel the prosecutor to produce all 
probable cause affidavits and warrant returns on searches of his residence between 
January 2006 and January 2007. R159-60. Defendant again reasoned that (a) the 
documents might provide evidence that some of the searches did not result in 
charges, (b) the charges might not have been filed because drugs were not found, 
(c) if drugs were not found and if the CI had sworn that he had seen them on the 
premises, their absence might suggest that he had lied, and (d) if he had lied when 
6
 Indeed, Detective Troxell, who had been investigating Defendant even 
before the CI contacted the Major Crimes Force, testified at sentencing about 
warrants that were executed on Defendant's premises, where drugs were not found. 
See R298:8. 
15 
he swore to an affidavit, he might have lied when he said he bought drugs from 
Defendant in the five controlled buys. R297:17-18. 
Background. The trial court had already noted that copies of search affidavits 
and returns for searches executed before December 2006 would not likely be 
available. See R297:16. As explained, the Fourth District's record keeping of these 
matters was deficient at the time. See id. The Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Anderson, which required the court to keep records of search warrants and their 
accompanying affidavits and returns, did not issue until December 2006, more than 
eleven months into the thirteen-month period for which Defendant requested 
records. 
Moreover, the trial court explained, even if the records existed and could be 
found, Defendant had shown no likelihood that the documents would be relevant or 
exculpatory. Rather, the court observed, "There are myriad[] ... reasons for which 
charges could not or would not be filed/' including the decision not "to burn your 
CI." R297:18. Accordingly, the trial court ruled, "So I don't find that trying to come 
up with any and all other probable cause affidavits that have to do with this 
residence would be instrumental in determining credibility or lack of credibility on 
the part of the CI." Id. 
Indeed, as the trial court explained, any information could only lead to a trial 
within a trial as to whether the search documents showed anything at all. "What, in 
16 
the end, you would have to do in order to go anywhere with this, is to put someone 
from the County Attorney's Office on the stand to explain why the charges weren't 
filed, or someone from Major Crimes Task Force to explain why the charges weren't 
filed." R297:18. The court concluded that the probative value of any resulting 
evidence would be outweighed by the danger of undue delay and waste of time, 
and therefore inadmissible under Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. See R297:18. 
Thus, because the documents alone, if any existed, would not show 
"credibility or lack of credibility on the part of the CI," the trial court denied the 
motion to compel the prosecutor to produce them. 
Surviving alternative basis for trial court's decision. Defendant challenges 
the trial court's denial of his request that the prosecutor be required to produce all 
probable cause affidavits and warrant returns on searches of his residence between 
January 2006 and January 2007. Defendant has argued that the documents might be 
relevant because they might show that searches based on some of the warrants may 
not have resulted in charges. Defendant has thus challenged the trial court's ruling 
that the documents were not sufficiently relevant to require a motion to compel. Br. 
Appellant at 17. But, once again, he has not addressed the trial court's 
determination that the pre-Anderson v. Taylor documents could not likely be located. 
Thus, an unchallenged basis survives to support the trial court's ruling, and this 
17 
Court need not address the relevancy issue. See State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, ^ 
20; Baker, 963 P.2d at 810. 
Merits. In any event, the trial court properly exercised its discretion. As 
explained, most of the materials requested by Defendant, if they had once existed, 
were likely unavailable due to deficiencies in the Fourth District's retention 
procedures. See R297:16. And, as the trial court observed, Defendant had only 
speculated that the material requested might contain some information possibly 
relevant to the CI's credibility. Defendant had not shown that the evidence would 
be exculpatory. See Pliego, 1999 UT 8,112 (requiring disclosure only of material 
known to the prosecutor that would be exculpatory or helpful to the defense). The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the probative value of any 
possibly relevant evidence would have been outweighed by the danger of undue 
delay and wasted time required to show why charges were not filed following the 
various searches. See R297:18. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when, under these circumstances, it denied Defendant's motion to compel discovery 
of any January 2006 to January 2007 affidavits. 
Harmlessness. Moreover, Defendant has not shown that he suffered any 
harm as a result of the trial court's ruling. Nothing in this record suggests that 
18 
Arthur Allred provided affidavit evidence to support any search warrants issued 
during the January 2006 through January 2007 period. 
Moreover, as explained under Point A., above, on cross-examination of 
Officer Troxell about the investigation of Defendant, defense counsel could have 
about any other searches on Defendant's residence conducted during that period, 
including whether Arthur Allred provided the affidavit testimony to support the 
warrant, and whether any drugs were found. She did not. 
Thus, even had the documents been relevant to the CI's credibility, any harm 
Defendant might have suffered resulted from defense counsel's decision not to ask 
about them, not from the trial court's decision to deny discovery. 
C The trial court properly denied Defendant's motion asking 
that the prosecutor be compelled to produce "text copies" of 
the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force procedures for 
controlled buys and for using voluntary or paid confidential 
informants. 
Defendant's third and fourth requests were that the court compel the 
prosecutor to produce "text copies" of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force 
7
 In fact, Officer Troxell testified that neither he nor the Major Crimes Force 
had any dealings with Arthur Allred until July or August 2006. See R288:64-65. This 
suggests that Allred could not have provided any affidavit testimony to the Major 
Crimes Task Force from January 2006 until July 2006, the first half of the period for 
which documents were requested. 
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procedures for controlled buys and its procedure for using voluntary or paid 
informants. See R158; R297:ll-12. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to 
deny that request. 
Background. At argument on Defendant's motion to compel, the parties 
addressed the requested "text copies/' Defense counsel stated that she wanted 
the copies "to see if they [the task force members] had actually followed their 
procedures." R297:ll. The Court asked what difference that would make. Id. 
Defense counsel replied, "I think it does go to the credibility of Officer Trox[e]ll, 
as he signed his oath that... [Defendant] was actually working off charges." 
R297:12. "The other part is ... that I would just like to know if they followed the 
procedure for ... using confidential informants in controlled buys." Id. 
The prosecutor responded, "There is no text copy of controlled buys, the 
procedures, or for using confidential informants for major crimes, as far as I know. 
I've spoken with Sergeant Trox[e]ll about that to find out, and he said that there was 
no written procedure." R297:14. 
In addition, as the prosecutor explained, defense counsel would have the 
opportunity to elicit any relevant information about the procedures during cross-
examination at trial. To prove his case at trial, the prosecutor would have to lay a 
"foundation for how the controlled buys [went] down" and "explainf] to the jury 
why we had the informant there, and how the process went, and how we know that 
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it was drugs that were purchased in the house, and not drugs that he carried with 
him/7 R297:14. Defense counsel, during cross-examination on these matters, would 
have the opportunity to "ask any questions she'd like about the process he follows/' 
Id. Thus, she could reach her questions about whether the officers followed any 
required procedures during cross-examination. 
The trial court denied Defendant's motion for text copies of the procedures. 
In ruling on the motion, the court relied on the prosecutor's statement that no 
written copies existed. R297:18-19. Moreover, the court explained, even if the 
written copies did exist, the court would not likely have granted the motion to 
compel the prosecutor to produce them. "This is not a trial of how the Major Crimes 
Task Force sends out its CI's, and how they pay them, or whether they are 
voluntary." R297:19. The court continued, "granting the motion to compel on those 
issues wouldn't get us anywhere." Id. "It's going to come down to the testimony 
offered, probably by the CI, and any support and corroboration that's offered by the 
officers who were there, and if your client decides to testify against his credibility." 
Id. 
Adequate briefing. Defendant has not addressed the court's ruling or 
reasoning for denying his request that the prosecutor produce the written 
procedures. See Br. Appellant at 12-18. Thus, to the extent he challenges the trial 
court's denial of his motion to compel their production, his claim is inadequately 
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briefed. See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, f 14,194 R3d 903 ("Since an appeal is a resort 
to a superior court to review the decision of a lower court, Utah appellate rules 
require the appellant to address reasons why the district court's [decision] should be 
overturned/'). 
Merits. In any event, the trial court properly denied Defendant's request for 
"text copies" of the procedures. As explained, the prosecutor stated that no written 
copies existed. R297:14. Defendant did not counter that statement. See id. 
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that such written procedures did exist. 
And, in addition, "text copies" of the procedures were not relevant to the 
issues before the court. As the court explained, "This [wa]s not a trial of how Major 
Crimes Task Force sends out its CI's, and how they pay them, or whether they're 
voluntary." R297:19. Rather, the issue in this case was whether Defendant had sold 
drugs to the CI on the five charged dates. Id. 
Harmlessness. Finally, as explained, even had the procedures been relevant, 
Defendant did not need written copies to address their relevance. As the prosecutor 
explained, he would need to lay foundation as trial about how Officer Troxell 
interacted with the CI and how the controlled buys proceeded. See R297:14. 
Defendant would then be free to cross-examine Officer Troxell about any of these 
matters and elicit any relevant information about the procedures employed. See id. 
And, at trial, the prosecutor did lay the necessary foundation by asking Officer 
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Troxell about the use of the confidential informant and the conduct of the controlled 
buys. See R288:64-93. But, on cross examination, defense counsel did not ask about 
the task force's procedures. See R288:104-24. 
Thus, Defendant suffered no harm when the trial court denied his motion to 
compel discovery of "text copies" of the Major Task Force's procedures on 
confidential informants and controlled buys. Counsel could have inquired about 
the task force's procedures, but apparently chose not to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted June J9\ , 2010. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
< ANNE B. INOUYE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or 
information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or 
mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant 
in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant 
is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as required 
by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as 
practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by notifying the opposing party 
that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. The prosecutor 
or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to 
discovery to prevent improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses from harassment, abuse, or undue 
invasion of privacy, including limitations on the further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or 
psychological or medical reports. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, 
that limitations on the further dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon 
motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written 
statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte 
showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made 
available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to 
comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit 
the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the 
circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials which can be obtained 
without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the alleged offense. Whenever the personal 
appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such 
appearance shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to comply with the 
requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of 
pre-trial release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with other evidence 
concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate. 
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1 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on October 10, 2007) 
3 THE COURT: Okay, let's go to the Tanner matter, then. 
4 All right. We're here for part two of the oral arguments tnat 
5 we started this morning until I decided I really needed to read 
6 the search warrant affidavit. I have now been provided with — 
7 and for the record, this is State vs. Michael Tanner, our file 
8 07 ending in 564. For the record, I have read the probable 
9 cause affidavit that was signed — it looks to me like Judge 
10 McVey, on October the 18th, 2006 at 1:40 in the afternoon. 
11 All right, so I now have, I think, more of a clue as 
12 to what's going on, at least with this affidavit. So having 
13 had the chance to look at that, why don't you start over again, 
14 Ms. Gonzales. 
15 MS. GONZALES: Your Honor, the reason that the defense 
16 is ask — is requesting the return on the search warrant, for 
17 that search warrant that was signed on October 18th, is because 
18 that the State is relying — the State's case actually depends 
19 upon the credibility of the CI, and the CI statements made to 
20 the officers of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force. 
21 In particular, the CI has said that he alleges he was 
22 inside Mr. Tanner's house and that he purchased methamphetamine 
23 from Mr. Tanner, and there was stored methamphetamine in a 
24 computer desk and under the bed. However — 
25 THE COURT: And that's within 72 hours of the 18th? 
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1 MS. GONZALES: Right. 
2 THE COURT: October 18th, when this search warrant was 
3 signed, right? 
4 MS. GONZALES: Yes, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: From paragraph 7? 
6 MS. GONZALES: Uh-huh. 
7 THE COURT: So that would make it up to three days 
8 before, which would be the 15th to the 18th, which, if I figure 
9 it right, is right between Counts VI and VII in time. Okay. 
10 MS. GONZALES: Yes, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: That's a pretty narrow time period. 
12 MS. GONZALES: And your Honor, I — what we would like 
13 to see is if that computer desk was even — even existed. We 
14 don't even know if that was actually there. We never — we 
15 don't — we don't see what was on the return of the search 
16 warrant. We don't see if they — if they even looked under 
17 the bed and found anything. 
18 I think, what's even more telling is that Mr. Tanner 
19 was — charges were never brought against Mr. Tanner, even 
20 after the search. So since charges weren't brought against 
21 Mr. Tanner, it seems whatever information this confidential 
22 informant was giving to the police officers, it doesn't seem 
23 that it was reliable, if he wasn't even charged with anything 
24 after those searches. 































search that computer desk, i 






£ they looked under 
your assumption is 
f they even found 
the bed; and 
that i 
the computer disk on the return on 







such found in computer de 
Yes. 




Okay, and we don't 
hang on. 












 ± f 
find 
/ is 
THE COURT: Hang on. Yeah. 
MS. GONZALES: Okay. 
THE COURT: So if nothing is found in the computer 
desk, and the computer desk is not even mentioned, how does 
that effect the credibility? In 72 hours, obviously, something 
can be gone from a desk. 
MS. GONZALES: But is that desk even actually there? 
THE COURT: Well --
MS. GONZALEZ: Is there actually a computer desk there? 
Are there scales or — 
THE COURT: — and I'm not sure that the return on the 
warrant's going to verify that for you. 
MS. GONZALES: But I don't see how it would hurt, 



























THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. GONZALES: — because we could see — we could — 
then we'd be able to see is there exculpatory evidence in this. 
I don't see what — how it would hurt the State to give us that 
return on the search warrant. 
THE COURT: Okay, and so then depending on what the 
search warrant tells you, you think it gives you knowledge 
and evidence that you can use to attempt to impeach the CI, 
who I take it is the most important witness for all of these 
transactions? 
MR. NIELSON: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, I think I understand the 
argument there. Now, explain to me why under the request that 
you have here for all other probable cause affidavits, that 
would be relevant. 
MS. GONZALES: Okay. 
THE COURT: You're talking about a year period from 
January 2006 to 2007. Why would 2007 be important at all, when 
I don't think anything that's in this Amended Information goes 
to 2007, does it? Oh, to February. Okay, so it goes a little 
bit into February. 
MS. GONZALES: Just a slight bit, yes. It's the second 
month. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. GONZALES: Your Honor, we are asking for that 
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1 because in the totality of the circumstances this was an 
2 ongoing investigation that had been going on for a long time; 
3 and these alleged buys, of course, did not occur in a vacuum. 
4 This was in an ongoing investigation. If — which we don't 
5 know — if this CI is the same person that's giving the 
6 information to the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force for 
7 the other searches, where Mr. Tanner was — charges weren't 
8 brought against him either, after those searches, it stands 
9 to reason, your Honor, that there must be exculpatory evidence, 
10 from what — from the information that the Utah County Major 
11 Crimes Task Force used in order to obtain those search 
12 warrants; and then going in the home on the search, after 
13 receiving — after receiving permission to search, they go 
14 into the house, and nothing seems to be found. So I would like 
15 to know what information they were basing the search on. 
16 THE COURT: I'm not making it there; and it's going to 
17 be exculptaory and applicable to the dates of October 3rd, 6th, 
18 12th, 19th, 24th of 2006 because if on all of these other alleged 
19 searches — 
20 MS. GONZALES: If it is — if it's the same CI, your 
21 Honor. 
22 THE COURT: If it's the same CI — 
23 MS. GONZALES: That's what we could like to know. 
24 THE COURT: -- and on all the alleged searches, they 
25 found nothing that would be exculptaory, and would prove that 
~7
~ 
1 one these certain dates — 
2 MS. GONZALES: Well, I think — 
3 THE COURT: Please don't interrupt me — 
4 MS. GONZALES: Okay, I'm sorry. I'm sorry, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Okay, I'm trying to work this out. I'm 
6 trying to follow your head, okay? So help me think. So your 
7 theory is that, number one, you want to find out if the CI's 
8 the same guy. Number two, if they found anything, because if 
9 they didn't find anything on all of those searches, that would 
10 be exculpatory evidence, and would tend to prove that the CI's 
11 lying, and therefore he's lying on all of these charges that 
12 happened later. Is that about it? 
13 MS. GONZALES: That's about it, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MS. GONZALES: Also, also the CI — on the probable 
16 cause affidavit that was signed on October 18th, Officer Troxall 
17 says that the CI's working off charges. The State has informed 
18 me that the CI wasn't working off charges, which were approved, 
19 and he says they were approved. These charges to be worked off 
20 were approved by the County Attorney's Office. Mr. Nielson's 
21 told me that he wasn't working off any charges, but I would 
22 like that in writing also. That's the — and which goes to — 
23 I would like — 
24 THE COURT: On the record's not good enough? 
25 MS. GONZALES: Excuse me? 
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1 THE COURT: On the record's not good enough? 
2 MS. GONZALES: I didn't — I remember him telling me 
3 outside. I don't remember him telling me on the record. So I 
4 just want to put it on the record. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Nielson, was the CI working off 
6 charges, as far as you know — 
7 MR. NIELSON: Your Honor --
8 THE COURT: — with the approval of the Utah County 
9 Attorney's office? That's the operative line. 
10 MR. NIELSON: Judge, I have no documentation on that 
11 with me today. It wasn't in the motion to compel that I have 
12 in front of me. This is what I recall of the situation with 
13 the confidential informant. He had been charged with a crime, 
14 was convicted of a crime; and it's my understanding that he 
15 offered, around the sentencing of that crime, to provide 
16 information about drug dealing, and worked as a CI for the 
17 Major Crimes Task Force. It was the end of 2006 the County 
18 Attorney's Office referred him over to Major Crimes for them 
19 to use as they felt was appropriate. 
20 They have the informant's name, the approximate dates. 
21 They can check and see what he was charged with in the Court's 
22 records, and what he actually ended up pleading to, to see what 
23 happened. As far as I know, there has never been a case that 
24 was held off in exchange for the CI doing anything for the 
25 County; and Major Crimes wasn't letting him work off charges 
-9-
1 instead of sending him to the County for screening, because the 
2 County Attorney's Office was the one that pointed him over to 
3 Major Crime's direction to work. 
4 So I think that by checking the Court records, 
5 Ms. Gonzales can find out what he'd been charged with and 
6 what he plead to. I don't have any further information beyond 
7 that. I guess I could start off the same place as her to look 
8 for that information. 
9 THE COURT: Okay, you don't have anything in your files 
10 that shows that some special consideration was recommended to 
11 the Judge at the time of sentencing? 
12 MR. NIELSON: I don't, Judge. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. NIELSON: That's not something that we'd know. 
15 That's something that usually gets pulled up to then bench and 
16 is taken, you know — you'd probably know — in front of the 
17 Judge. I just don't have those details. 
18 MS. GONZALES: I was — well, your Honor, it was just 
19 that the statement in that probable cause affidavit is — was 
20 that the County Attorney's Office had already approved that 
21 his charges could be worked off; but it sounds to me that the 
22 County Attorney's Office had not approved it, but referred the 
23 matter over later. 
24 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
2 5 MR. NIELSON: T h a t ' s j u s t the way I unders tood i t . I 
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addressed the issue with Mr. Buhman last week; and that was 
the best of our recollection as to it, but we weren't able to 
3 I locate any documentation on it at that point, but then we 
4 didn't do a detailed search either into the computer records 
5 or anything. 
6 So I think that he had — if it serves what people 
7 told me, if it's correct, that it was something like a forgery 
8 case that he had been charged with. 
9 THE COURT: What more do you want? 
10 MS. GONZALES: I just wanted to know if they had 
11 actually approved — 
12 THE COURT: Well --
13 MS. GONZALES: — his charges to be worked off. 
14 THE COURT: — sounds like not. 
15 MS GONZALES: Hasn't said --
16 MR. NIELSON: I don't know anything — 
17 MS. GONZALES: — it sounds like. 
18 MR. NIELSON: — further than that. So I —- from 
19 what — the way I understood it, he didn't start working for 
20 anything for major crimes until after his other case had been 
21 settled; and I don't believe he's been in trouble with any 
22 cases since then. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MS. GONZALES: Which case? 
25 MR. NIELSON: I don't think he's had a new case since 
- 1 1 -
1 then. I don't think he's had any new violations of the law. 
2 MS. GONZALES: Since working — 
3 THE COURT: Since being put on — 
4 THE COURT: In October? 
5 MR. NIELSON: I would assume that he's probably on 
6 Court probation or AP&P probation, based on his previous cases. 
7 I don't think he's had any violations of those probations; but 
8 again, that's not something I've researched on. He's not the 
9 defendant on this case. 
10 MS. GONZALES: All right. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Well, I think, that pretty well 
12 resolves that one. Any other requests? 
13 MS. GONZALES: No, your Honor, just that it — you 
14 know, I've — no, I've covered everything, I think. Yeah. 
15 THE COURT: Well, you also asked for a copy of their 
16 procedure for controlled buys, and a copy of their procedure 
17 for using voluntary or paid confidential informants. Are you 
'18 withdrawing that — those two requests? 
19 MS. GONZALES: No, your Honor, it was — I wanted the 
20 text copy for the confidential informants to see if they had 
21 actually followed their procedure — 
22 THE COURT: What difference would it make? 
23 'MS. GONZALES: — and the — well, your Honor, to me it 
24 makes a difference. 



























' MS. GONZALES: No, but I think it does go to the 
credibility of Officer Troxall, as he signed his oath that 
this is that he was actually working off charges that had 
already been approved by the County Attorney. 
The other part is, your Honor, that I would just like 
to know if they followed the procedure for the — for the confi 
— using confidential informants in controlled buys. 
THE COURT: What difference would that make at trial? 
MS. GONZALES: I just — I wanted to see if — well, I 
don't know what the procedure is. I would like to see what the 
procedure is; and then that way, if they have to rely more on 
just statements that this CI is making, because at trial this 
— basically, these are just statements that the CI has made. 
The officers hadn't witnessed any — much of anything. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, anything else? 
MS. GONZALES: No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Nielson? 
MR. NIELSON: Yes, ma'am. Your Honor, in regards 
to No. 1 in the request, I, first of all, don't think it's 
relevant. A search of the house that was authorized — and 
that's what the search warrant is, is an authorization to 
search the house '— was authorized October 18th. 
The house wasn't actually searched until October 25th. 
Had we charged somebody with a crime from stuff that we'd found 
on October 25th, defense Counsel would be in here saying that 
1 the information in the warrant was step. So I think it's not 
2 relevant in that point. 
3 It also, even if nothing was found in the house, it 
4 doesn't mean that he didn't sell drugs to the informant on 
5 those days. We have the proof, and we're comfortable going 
6 forward, that he had the drugs there on those days. 
7 From the 18th to the 25th,. he could have — and that 
8 was the day they got the warrant, and then he'd been in the 
9 house days before that — he could have sold the drugs, used 
10 the drugs, or anything else. We do have proof that we could 
11 bring to Court of him using drugs there at the computer desk, 
12 and the State would be more than happy to put on that evidence, 
13 if the Counsel would like, to show that — that could be an 
14 explanation of why the drugs are no longer there. 
15 There's also issues about searches of the house. When 
16 the police officer searched the house, sometimes people hide 
17 stuff well, and we just can't find it. There may have been 
18 other reasons why the County Attorney's Office or Major Crimes 
19 decided they didn't want to act on those search warrant — or 
20 the information they obtained during that search. 
21 It's just not relevant to what was bought, the drugs 
22 that were purchased on the dates in question. It would only 
2 3 be relevant if it was going to something that we were charging 
2 4 with for finding his house on that day. We chose not to charge 
2 5 him with anything at that time. 
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1 I For No. 2, it's just expanding number — Count I to a 
2 wider range of time. The February charges were a search of his 
3 house. So I would agree. A search warrant for February is 
4 appropriate; and I think we've turned all of the February 
5 search warrant information over to defense Counsel, for them 
6 to prepare for the February charges. I'm not aware of anything 
7 for February that's missing. 
8 In regards to Nos. 3 and 4, it's the same response 
9 for both of those. There is no text copy of control buys, 
10 the procedures, or for using confidential informants for major 
11 crimes, as far as I know. I've spoken with Sergeant Troxall 
12 about that to find out, and he said that there was no written 
13 procedure. 
14 I So Ms. Gonzales will be able to, on cross, ask any 
15 questions she'd like about the process that he follows. I'en 
16 sure that is something that will be coming out on direct, when 
17 we're laying a foundation for how the controlled buys go down, 
18 and explaining to the jury why we had the informant there, and 
19 how the process went, and how we know that it was drugs that 
20 were purchased in the house, and not drugs that he carried in 
21 with him or anything like that. So there is no text copy to 
22 turn over for No. 3 and 4 that I was able to locate. 
23 THE COURT: Any last words? 
24 MS. GONZALES: No, your Honor, except for the offering 
25 of proof that Mr. Tanner uses drugs. Would that offer of proof 
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1 be from the search of his house on February 2007? 
2 MR. NIELSON: Yes, it would. 
3 MS. GONZALES: Your Honor, that goes to the trial that 
4 we — that's been severed. I don't believe that has anything 
5 to do with this case. 
6 MR. NIELSON: Well, if you want to say — there's no 
7 reason — that if there's no drugs in the house, the only 
8 possible conclusion is that he's not a drug dealer. There's 
9 other explanations for that. We have proof of other ways the 
10 drugs have left the house. 
11 MS. GONZALES: That's not what I'm saying. My reason 
12 is to — is the CI credible in the statements that he made to 
13 Major Crimes Task Force. 
14 THE COURT: All right. I turn to Rule 16 of the Utah 
15 Rules of Criminal Procedure, subparagraph (a), I find that 
16 subparagraph's (a)(1), (2), (3) don't really apply here. 
17 We're looking at either (a)(4), "Evidence known to the 
18 prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused," 
19 exculpatory. "Evidence mitigate the guilt of the defendant, 
20 or mitigate the degree of offense for the reduced punishment," 
21 and (a)(5) — excuse me — "Any other items of evidence which 
22 the Court determines on good cause shown should be made 
23 available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
24 adequately prepare his defense. 
25 So, let's look at these one by one. No. 1, a copy of 
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1 the return of search warrant affidavit for the search warrant 
2 issued on October 18th, 2006 on the residence of 375 West 300 
3 North, in Provo, Utah. 
4 My understanding from the parties is that the search 
5 warrant, obviously, has been provided, because I was finally 
6 given a copy of it, and, for the record, that's the search 
7 warrant that was signed on October 18th, by Judge McVey. I 
8 think the stipulation of the parties has been that it was 
9 executed on the 25th, week later. I note, that the search 
10 warrant was signed in between two of the dates that are 
11 involved in this trial. 
12 The Counts that are being tried are Counts IV through 
13 VIII. We've severed the other three. Count's III — I'm 
14 sorry, Count's IV, V, and VI, occurred on October 3rd, 6th, 
15 and 12th, VII and VIII occurred on the 19th and 20th. So the 
16 search warrant was signed in between the dates, but was not 
17 served until after the last date. 
18 So I turn to relevance and whether or not there's good 
19 cause under Rule 16 for me to grant this motion to compel as 
20 to the first request. Frankly, the real question is whether 
21 anybody can find a copy of the return on the warrant, since I 
22 think — I can't remember when the Anderson came — case came 
23 down, and when it was we started keeping all of these things 
24 down in the clerk of the Court's office. 
25 Mr. Nielson: It was after this. We've tried to locate 
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1 it. 
2 THE COURT: That's what I thought. So I'm not sure the 
3 Court has one. If you haven't found it here, I don't know that 
4 we can find it either, because in those days there wasn't an 
5 organized way of doing it. 
6 At any rate, I am not persuaded that the return on 
7 the warrant is relevant to the dates in Counts IV through VIII, 
8 which are now set for trial. The fact that there was or wasn't 
9 a computer desk can be testified to by the CI, and any other 
10 officers that have gone through executions of search warrants 
11 there. 
12 Whether or not there were drugs in that computer desk 
13 on the 25th, which is after these dates, becomes irrelevant, in 
14 my estimation. The defendant could have used them, he could 
15 have sold them. They might not have ever been there, but I 
16 don't think finding — if it could be found — the return on 
17 the warrant, helps us at all with any of the issues that are 
18 relevant to this case. So I'm going to deny the motion to 
19 compel on that issue. 
20 As to the No. 2 request, which is a copy of any and 
21 all other probable cause affidavits, in support and application 
22 for search warrant, return of search warrant affidavits for 
2 3 this residence for the dates of January 2006 through January 
24 2007. 
25 Part of the argument here is that this would be 
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1 exculpatory evidence, because these search warrants, apparently 
2 — and searches apparently didn't result in any charges against 
3 the defendant or anyone else. There are myriads of reasons for 
4 which charges could not or would not be filed. 
5 My experience as a prosecutor was there are many times 
6 when you don't file the charges, because you don't want to burn 
7 your CI. You decide in the end you'd rather keep using your 
8 CI, than burn the CI by filing the charges. I note in this 
9 case the charges weren't filed until February 9th, of 2007, 
10 which is some time after the October charges. 
11 So I don't find that trying to come up with any and 
12 all other probable cause affidavits that have to do with this 
13 residence would be instrumental in determining credibility or 
14 lack of credibility on the part of the CI. 
15 What, in the end, you would have to do in order 
16 to go anywhere with this, is to put someone from the County 
17 Attorney's Office on the stand to explain why the charges 
18 weren't filed, or someone from Major Crimes Task Force to 
19 explain why the charges weren't filed. In terms of a 401, 
20 2 and 3 analysis, this is a waste of the jury's time, and 
21 it's not likely to bring us to evidence which is helpful or 
22 admissible. So I deny the request on that basis. 
23 As for a text copy of either the Major Crimes Task 
2 4 Force procedure for controlled buys or the procedure for using 
25 voluntary or paid confidential informants, the statement from 
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1 the County Attorney Deputy, who is here, is that it doesn't 
2 exist; and even if it existed, I most likely would not have 
3 ordered it, or granted the motion to compel on those issues. 
4 This is not a trial of how Major Crimes Task Force 
5 sends out its CI's, and how they pay them, or whether they're 
6 voluntary. It's going to come down to the testimony offered, 
7 probably, by the CI, and any support and corroboration that's 
8 offered by the officers who where there, and if your client 
9 decides to testify against his credibility. Bottom line is, 
10 the County Attorney's Office says they've checked with Major 
11 Crimes, and they don't exists. So my doing — granting the 
12 motion to compel on those issues wouldn't get us anywhere. 
13 So with that, I deny the motion to compel; and that 
14 takes us forward to the trial. I'll ask my clerk to enter — 
15 this needs to be entered. That came in just before lunch. I 
16 have the State's proposed jury instructions. Let's see, did 
17 you say last week that you were content with these, or are you 
18 going to file your own? 
19 MS. GONZALES: I was content with those, yes, your 
20 Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Okay, and they have all the little nit-
22 picky ones — oh, I'm still waiting for the double spaced — 
23 MR. NEILSON: Your Honor, I have emailed those to your 
24 clerk. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
-2 0-
1 MR. NIELSON: If they weren't (inaudible) themselves, 
2 THE COURT: So Travis should have them? 
3 MR. NIELSON: Yes, ma'am. 
4 THE COURT: Okay, and then I was going to say, we have 
5 all the nit-picky ones about — okay, there are the elements — 
6 I mean the intent, different types of intent. Do we have a 
7 definition of what a drug-free zone is? 
8 MS. GONZALES: I believe it is in there. 
9 MR. NIELSON: I believe so. I think I was pretty 
10 detailed on that. 
11 THE COURT: Okay, good. All right, we'll take a look 
12 at them. Then that takes us back to our trial date, which is 
13 the 16th, next Monday? 
14 MS. GONZALES: Tuesday. 
15 THE COURT: Tuesday. Oh, that's right. 
16 MR. NIELSON: Tuesday, the 16th. 
17 THE COURT: Right date, wrong day of the week. Okay, 
18 so that'll be the 16th; and we'll have the jury here at 8:15. 
19 I'm going to send my clerk out right now to — how many do you 
20 think we need? It's a one day trial. So I don't think we'll 
21 need any alternate jurors. So in the end, we need 16, so that 
22 you can strike 4 each. I would really think if we had 30, we 
23 ought to be okay. That means we could loose 14. Although if 
24 we had 3 or 4 not show — why don't we say 34, okay? Why don't 
25 you send out 34. 
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1 All right, I'll have my clerk get that out today. 
2 MR. NIELSON: Judge, the reason it was cut down to a 
3 one day trial is because there was the stipulation about chain 
4 of custody for the drugs — 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MR. NIELSON: — from the time they got to the police 
7 officers to the time they got to the lab to be tested. So 
8 we'll have, as far as witnesses, the CI stating that he bought 
9 the drugs; the police officers that handled him and took the 
10 drugs; and then the crime lab that tested the drugs. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. NIELSON: And the rest of the chain has been 
13 stipulated to. Then, your Honor, the State filed a motion 
14 to quash the subpoenas duces tecum that were issued by the 
15 defense; and I don't know if you've received that or not yet, 
16 but it's kind of moot now, because the subpoenas were for 
17 yesterday, and you've kind of ruled on all those issues. 
18 THE COURT: I assumed that we were taking care of the 
19 subpoenas duces tecum today. 
20 MS. GONZALES: Yeah, I believed that. 
21 MR. NIELSON: Okay. 
22 THE COURT: All right, so I think that's resolved. 
23 MR. NIELSON: Okay, just want to make sure everything's 
24 cleared up. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So is the stipulation 
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1 still good as to the chain of custody? 
2 MS. GONZALES: Yes. 
3 THE COURT: All right, so we shouldn't have any problem 
4 there. I think, with that, any other witnesses that you want 
5 there, you'd better bring in yourself — 
6 MS. GONZALES: All right. 
7 THE COURT: — if there are any other officers you want 
8 there. 
9 MS. GONZALES: No, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Just as long as I don't have to deal with 
11 this at trial. 
12 MS. GONZALES: I've given my witness list already. 
13 THE COURT: He's told you who — maybe you'd better 
14 name her the officers that you have coming. 
15 MR. NIELSON: I have Mark Troxall and Bill Young. 
16 THE COURT: Okay, so there — 
17 MR. NIELSON: And then there's two guys from the crime 
18 lab, because there were different people that tested the drugs. 
19 One on like four of the dates, and one on the fifth, a separate 
2 0 guy. 
21 THE COURT: Any issues as to expert notice on the crime 
22 lab? 
23 MR. NIELSON: It's the State Crime Lab. So they were 
24 already on notice for that* 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
-23-
MS. GONZALES: Yep, that's fine. 
THE COURT: Okay. Great, we'll see you then; and 
you'11 take care of getting him appropriate clothing? 
MS. GONZALES: Yes, ma'am. 
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